Brazil Recasts Trademark Coexistence Review and Gives Consent Letters Real Weight

On June 30, Brazil’s National Institute of Industrial Property (INPI) released a new rule on the examination of trademark coexistence agreements and Letters of Consent. The practical shift is substantial: where the conflicting parties have signed a coexistence arrangement, examiners are now expected, as a rule, to accept that arrangement and allow registration, with tighter scrutiny reserved for high-risk fields such as medicines and public safety.

This changes a long-standing instinct in Brazilian trademark practice. Until now, coexistence agreements were often treated as supporting material rather than something that could decisively move a case. The new rule points in the opposite direction. INPI also closed off a familiar line of argument in bad-faith filing disputes: a local filer may no longer rely on the fact that the same brands coexist abroad as a defence for opportunistic conduct in Brazil.

This is more than a softer rule: it shifts commercial judgment back to the parties

The most important point is not simply that Brazil has become more permissive. It is that INPI appears to be redrawing the line between public review and private ordering. For years, Brazilian practice gave examiners broad room to override what sophisticated parties had already negotiated, even when both sides were prepared to define their own market boundaries and live with coexistence.

The June 30 change reverses that default. A signed coexistence agreement is no longer framed as a document that might help if the examiner happens to be persuaded; it is meant to be accepted in principle, except in special risk scenarios. For international brand owners, that matters immediately. Brazil has often been the jurisdiction where a global settlement still did not guarantee a workable local outcome. This reform makes it more plausible that negotiated brand architecture, product carve-outs and channel restrictions will actually be respected in prosecution.

The carve-outs still matter, especially where confusion can cause more than ordinary market harm

The rule is not a blank cheque. Medicines, public safety and other high-risk areas remain subject to stronger intervention, which is consistent with the logic behind the old practice: in some sectors, a mistake about commercial origin can produce consequences that go beyond ordinary purchasing confusion. Health, safety and public reliance concerns give the office reason to remain cautious even when both proprietors are willing to coexist.

That means companies should not focus only on obtaining a signature. The agreement itself now becomes more important as an operational document. It should define which marks may coexist, for which goods and services, under what packaging, channels, territorial limits or presentation constraints, and what each side must do if friction arises later. A vague consent letter may carry more formal weight than before, but a carefully drafted Brazil-facing agreement will still carry far more practical credibility.

Bad-faith filers lose a convenient argument

The second major signal is directed at opportunistic applicants. In many Latin American disputes, a local filer tries to wrap a bad-faith application in the language of global market reality: the parties coexist elsewhere, distribution histories are fragmented, group structures are complex, so the Brazilian filing should not be treated as abusive. INPI’s new position draws a firmer line. Consensual coexistence between legitimate right holders is one thing; using foreign coexistence to sanitise a local grab is another.

That distinction matters because bad-faith filings are rarely crude copies in a vacuum. They often exploit timing gaps, uneven filing coverage, former distributorships or parallel use by related companies in different territories. By refusing to let “they coexist abroad” do defensive work in Brazil, INPI is signalling that the office will look more closely at the applicant’s conduct and context, not just at the existence of a foreign commercial arrangement.

What brand owners should do next in Brazil

First, revisit matters that were delayed, narrowed or refused despite the existence of a consent or coexistence agreement. If a portfolio has already been rationalised globally, Brazil may no longer deserve to be treated as the outlier where settlement documents are filed mainly for optics. Pending applications, responses to office actions and opposition strategy should all be reviewed in light of the new posture.

Second, upgrade the way coexistence documents are drafted. The change solves a recognition problem, not a strategy problem. It does not replace early filing, and it will not repair a hesitant portfolio by itself. Rights holders should now align coexistence terms, bad-faith evidence, ownership history, group-company explanations and Brazilian filing timing in one coherent plan. The companies that benefit most from this shift will not be those that merely produce a consent letter, but those that use it as part of a disciplined Brazil trademark strategy.